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Targeting Arab/Muslim/
South Asian Americans:

Criminalization and Cultural Citizenship
Louise Cainkar and Sunaina Maita
Introduction

Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians have been the primary targets

of the U.S. government's global War on Terror since the Septem
ber 11, 2001 attacks.1 Those who live in the United States are no ex
ception. They have been subjected to extensive "security" mea�

sures since the a ttac ks, their rights undermined if not revoked

by new policies.. has tily passed legislation, and selective la\v en

forcement.2 They have been portrayed in the mainstream media
and by a number of U.S. government officials as citizen-suspects
who lie outside American cultural norms, and as communities

that harb or sleeping terrorists, posing a threat to the nation1s
security. In this essay, we focus on how Arabs, Muslims, and
"

"

South Asians have been framed and targeted through a process

of criminalization that represents tRem as members of a deviant

group whose belief system is distinctly IIforeign" and opposed to

core American values. Members of this group are presume d to

eTA
)EM)

inherently support criminal actions defined as IIterrorist" activity.

We argue that the ideological process of criminalization leads to

the exclusion of Arab and South Asian Muslim Americans from
full national belonging, or cultural citizenship.

In thi s essay, we further explore the responses of Arab and

South Asian Muslim communities to the War on Terror, and ask
:
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whether these responses reveal alliance-building and pan-ethnic
identification. Do the targeted groups, now' portrayed as mono
lithic, find solidarity with each other, and if so, what are the bases
for their sense of affinity? These questions force us to consider
deeper issues of pan-ethnic and political affiliation that highlight
quandaries at the core of Asian American studies: how does a
pan-ethnic approach challenge or support the racial and cultural
categories used by state and empire to subordinate and divide
populations? Are there fruitful linkages that can be made be
tween Asian American and Arab American studies that could il
lunlinate these processes of social classification and shed light on
geographic, national, and racial boundaries? Such questions are
central to the vision and purpose of Asian American and Arab
American studies. We seek to draw attention to common experi
ences between the subjects of Asian American and Arab Ameri
can studies to provide a critique of the conventional' boundaries
established by ethnic and area studies, to uncover their link to state
policies, and to bring forth a more radical vision for our intellec
tual work in the post-9/ 11 moment.
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Criminalization and Cultural Citizenship
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Our argument hinges on the use of two major analytic concepts,
criminalization and cultural citizenship, and their relationship to
each other, to explain the targeting of Arabs, South Asians, and
Muslims in the U.s. after 9/11. We define criminalization as a pro"
cess by which the state creates and enforces penalties for actions
that it claims violate public safety. Our critique of crimina liz a
tion centers on state policies objectively unrelated to actual pub
lic harm and on selective enforcement of laws so that particular
groups are penalized, but not others. Criminalization is often dis
cussed in relation to s\veeps, as when police usweep" certain ar
eas of homeless persons before major events,3 or "sweep" youth
preemptively off street corners, and clearances, through \vhich
authorities "clear" members of targeted groups to carry on 'with
daily life activities, a process expressed in the term "driving
while Black." Criminalized groups are often tracked and moni
tored. While the state attempts to legitimate these policies by
claiming that the groups targeted are a public safety threat, in
practice, their implementation reveals more than anything the
powerlessness of the targeted groups. The War on Crime, the
War on Drugs, and no\v the War on Terror share these features
of criminalization processes.4 Features of the domestic War on

2

Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"

co

not
hav€'

nic

no'""

:ses
det
ght
�s a
Ifal

ide
be

l il-

:on
are
rab
eti
eri
ries
tate
le c

pts,

P to

and

Jro
ons
iza
lub
ula.r
dis
ar
IUth
1ich
vi th
ing
l

r

oni

; by

t, in
the
the
Llres

ron

Ter ror tha t c riminalize the innocen t through s\,:,"eeps, clearances,
and mon itorin g, in clude dragnet arrests, undercover activi ties a t

mosques, and Special Re gistra tion of Muslim men .
Criminalization and cultural citizenship are related as they
are both embed d ed in power relations and in p rocesses of disci
pliningsubjects by the state through law, policy, and cultural and
social categorizations. Cultural cit izenship is defined as the ev
eryday ex p erience of belonging to the nation-state in relation to
experiences of inclusion and exclusion . Citizenship has tradition�
ally been thou ght of in politi cal, economic, and civic terms,S but
more recent an alyses focus on the notion of cultural citizenship.
As mu l tiethnic societies are forced to confront questions of differ
e nce that undergird social inequality, it has become clear that the
rights and obligations onegal citizenship are mediated by race, eth
n icity, gender, and sex uality, as well as religion . These social loca
tions-as much or more than legal citizenship-affect the extent to
which a group feels and acts like a member of the nation-state in
which it resides. 6 Cultu ral citizenship, accord ing to anthro pol o
gist Lok Siu, consists of the "behaviors, disco urses, and practices
that give meaning to citi zens hip as live d experience" in the co n
text of "an uneven and co mpl ex field of structural ine qualities, "
the "quotidian practi ces of inclusion and exclusion ."7

Latino studies scholars Renato Rosaldo, William Flores, and
Rina Benmayor developed the concept of cultural citizenship to
connect t he cultural and c ivi l rights of immigran ts to new social
movements.s Their appro ach to cultural citizenship analyzes "how
cu.1tural phenomena-f rom p ra cti ces that organ ize t he daily life
of i ndividuals, families, and the c o mmu ni ty, to linguistic and ar
tistic expression-cross the political realm and contribute to the
process of affi rming and build ing an emerging Latino identit y
and political and social consciousness."9 Others, such as Aihwa
Ong, are concerned with the process by \vhich the s tate regu lates
individual behaviors and beliefs about national belon ging. Ong
defines cultural citizenship as Iia dual process of self-making and
being-made within webs of power linked to the n at i on-s ta te and:
civil society."10

Cul tural citizenshi p is linked to the process of criminaliza
Hon beca use t�e precursor and o ut c ome of group criminalization
is cultural and pblitical ex clusion from the na ti on-state. Arab
and South Asian Muslims in the U.S. have beeh denied their rights
not only by official state policies, but also by representations that
have construed these groups as outside the bo und s of U.S. cul-
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tural citizenship. Groups with political power lie inside the cul

tural norm of national belong ing and have the power to prevent

policy-making that ,vould criminalize themselves. Cultural rep
resentations of Arabs and Muslims,.in particular, draw on dis
tinctions between a presumably super ior "Western" civilization
and an exotic and supposedly barbaric uMuslim \vorId." These
ideas justify discriminatory state policies as well as U.S. military
interventions in a broadly defined Middle East, the geographies
of the "clash between civilizations." Arabs and Muslims in the
West are portrayed in this Orientalist \vorldview as inherently
foreign, essentially unassimilable, and a potential enemy \vith
in.l1
Why have Arab and South Asian Muslims in the United
. States been selected for criminalization by state policies and ex
clusion from cultural citizenship? We argue that the U.S. govern
ment has targeted these groups both before and after 9/ 11 be
cause of its part icular pol itical interests in the reg ions fronl which
these communities originate. The criminalization of these groups
is linked to the rise of the U.s. as a global po·wer and to silencing
dissent of its foreign policy objectives. Since 9/ 11, they have pro
vided an internal and external scapegoat for the nation's foreign
pol icy failures, the perceived sense of vulnerability of its inhabit
ants, and its inability to protect its citizens. Excluding Arab and

South Asian Muslims from cultural citizenship and criminal iz



ing their communities is th e ideological and practical work that
builds popular support for sacrificing their c ivil rights for the

LI'l
o
o
N

presumed sense of safety of the majority, links them to "enemy"
nations and combatants, and deleg itimizes their dissent. Isolated
as potentially d isloyal, in part using notions of essential cultural
difference that are diffused through the mainstream media and
in popul ar culture representations, the profiling arid criminal
ization of these groups by the state is tolerated by the public.
Arabs, Muslim, and South Asian Americans become accepted as
cultural ou tsiders, so that what happens to them is (falsely) seen
as not affecting anyone else. In the process, the state whittles
away one democ ratic right after another, so that prolonged and
secret detentions, detention without charge, and even torture of
detainees become acceptable state practices in the name of Unational security."
Before 9/11, about 80 percent of the American pu blic thought
it was \vrong for law enforcement to use racial profiling, a term
popularly used to refer to the disproportionate targeting of Af-

4
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riean American drivers by police. After the shock of the 9/ 11

attacks, a majority of the American public favored racial profil

ing, Uat least as long as it \vas directed at Arabs and Muslims."12
Many also believed it ,vas better to limit the presence of Arabs
and Muslims in the United St�tes. A March 2002 CNN /Gallup/
USA Today poll found that nearly 60 percent of Americans fa
vored reducing the number of Muslim immigrants admitted to
the United States.13 Negative and racist media portrayals of Ar
abs and South Asian Muslims lent ongoing support to domestic
and global state policies so that a n October, 2002 ABC News/Be
Befnet poll found that the proportion of American adults holding
an unfavorable view of Islam had risen from 24 percent to 33
percent in the nine months from January to October 2002.14 As
recently as December 2004, Cornell University found that near
ly 50 percent of respondents in a national poll believed the U.S.
government should curtail civil liberties for Muslim Americans.1s
The racial profiling of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians by the
state is akin to a form of Green McCarthyi s m, as Vijay Prashad
points out, and is not just a version of the common, domestic form
of racial profiling. While the notion of race has always been an
ambiguous social construct in the U.S., it is also true that domes
tic racialization policies have been linked to the state's interna
tional policies, in addition to its domestic agendas,16
Arab Ameri can communities have endured racial profiling
by the state for years, because of U.S. foreign policies in the Arab
\vorld, specifically tied to U.S. support of the Israeli occupation of
Palestine. Well before 9/ 11, Arab Americans exp e rience d special
legislation and policing actions aimed at pro-Palestinian politi
cal activists 'whose main outcome has been to stifle their voices
in American political debate.17 Nonviolent activists have been
spied on and threatened ,vith deportation, including naturalized
U.S. citizens. As was characteri�tic of state-sponsored repression
during the Mc Carthy era and Hoover's FBI, lawful challenges
to U.S. policies (this time related to the Middle East) became an
obsessive target of U.S. intelligence agencies. For such instances,!
see the documentation of Operation Boulder and the Los Angeles
8 case.tS Consecutive pieces of anti-terrorism legislation that re
placed anti-communist laws with laws that mainly targeted Ar
abs, and the historic exclusion of Arabs from political campai gns,
including the return of Arab-American campaign donations, have
assu re d a silenced Arab American community in which many
are fearful of expressing dissent.19
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Post-9/11 Policies of Criminalization
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The U.S. government implemented a broad range of administra
tive, legislative, and judicial measures in the name of national
security and the War on Terror after the attacks of September 11,
with little public debate. Among these were: mass arrests, secret
and indefinite detentions, prolonged detention of ILmaterial wit
nesses," closed hearings, secret evidence, eavesdropping on attor
ney�client conversations, FBI horne and work visits, wiretapping,
property sei.zures, selective removals of aliens with technical visa
violations, and mandatory Special Registration. At least 100,000
Arabs and South Asian Muslims living in the United States have
personally experienced one of these measures.20 Twenty-five of
the thirty-seven known U.S. government security initiatives im
plemented in the eighteen months after the September 11 attacks
explicitly or implicitly targeted Arabs and South Asian Muslims
in the United States.21 This legal and political context has been
augmented by sensationalized media p ortrayals of Muslims,
strong anti-Muslim/anti-Islamic rhetoric from the political right,
and continued public backlash, evidenced in hate crimes, hate
speech, and job discrimination. Arab and South Asian Muslims
'
report beifig marginalized as lithe other" in American society by
policies that have singled them out as a group that is dangerotls
and potentially subversive; they express serious concerns about
their civil rights and safety under these conditionsP
The U.S. Congress diminished the civil rights of all Ameri
cans when it hastily passed the USA Patriot Act (Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001), crafted by the
executive branch, in October 2001.23 The USA Patriot Act ex
pands the power of the U.S. government to use surveillance and
wiretapping without first showing probable cause, permits se
cret searches and access to private records by government agents
without oversight, authorizes the detention of immigrants on al
leged suspicions, denies admission to t he United States because
of a person's speech, and expands the concept of guilt by associa
tion, among other erosions of basic civil rights. T he overwhelm
ing majority of known uses of these powers have been exercised
on Arab and South Asian Muslims in the U.S. Comparing the
government's response to the September 11 attacks to the 1919
Palmer Raids, World War II internment of persons of Japanese
descent, and Cold War McCarthyism, legal scholar David Cole
identifies the targeting of immigrants and vulnerable groups;
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Cambridge' rally bya coalition of organizations, including South Asian Com
mittee on Human Rights, to oppose Special Registration for i'v1uslim males,
August 2, 2003.
Photograph by Louise Cainkar
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fOCllS on political speech, political activity, and group identity;
.andreliance on broad sweeps instead o f foe-llsed, objectiveinves
tigations into the behavior of individuals as common elements.
These types of sw eeping measures have in the past led to Hn1is
guided enforcement directed at political dissidents rather than
.
crirrtinals. "24
Imrn.ediately after the 9/11 attacks, sorne 1,200 citizens and
non-citizens, ahnost exclusively Arab and South Asian 11uslirrt
m.ales, were swept up and detained under high security condi
tions.2S Their identities are largely unknown because the fed
eral government has not released this lnformation. More than
500,vere picked up for technical visa violations and eventually
deported after b ei ng cleared of terrorist connections.26 Special
security checks and ren10val fron1 airplanes -rNere im.plemented
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for Arab and South Asian men presumed to be Muslims trav

eling through U.S. airports. "Flying while Arab" was the title
of a piece in the February 2002 issue of Arab-A'merican Business

Mag�zine, describing

the �e experiences as the airborne equiva
driving while Black." 1J\lhile the mass arrests and, airline
profiling started decreasingin rrdd-2002, Arabs and South Asian
Muslims have continued to feel under siege because of ongoing
hc)me and business r ai d s FBI interviews, s pying and wiretap
ping, fear over the crirninalization of charitable donations, and

lent of
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banking policies that have forced closure of some of their private
. and business accounts.27
The federal government's actions since 9/11 have led the
American civil rights community to protest that it has over
stepped its legitimate power in its mission to secure the U.S. and
its borders.28 Legal experts point out that the state has engaged
in measures that are "unnecessary, unconstitutional, and coun·
terproductive."29 Many question whether selling "a vulnerable
minority's rights ... in the name of security" has made the coun
try safer, let alone \vhether this is even morally justifiable for a
presumably democratic sOciety.3D The national security benefit of
all these measures is highly questionable. An analysis of the out
comes of nlore than 300 terrorism·related cases completed since
9/11 shows a pattern of plea-bargained convictions on charges
uruelated to terrorism.31 When removal (deportation) is easier than
proving a case, as in the case of non-citizens, the government has
.
often taken the former option.

Special Registration: A Policy
of Tracking and Removal

VI
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One selectively enforced and discriminatory federal policy is the
U.S. government's "Special Registration" program. On Septem
ber 11, 2002�the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
then part of the Department of Justice, implemented this track
ing and clearance program, requiring II certain non-immigrant
aliens" to register with the U.S. immigration authorities, be fin
gerprinted and photographed, respond to questioning, and sub
mit to regular reporting.3! The targeted aliens were male visitors
aged 16..64 from twenty-three Muslim-majority countries in Asia
and the Arab world, plus heavily Muslim Eritrea and North Ko
rea. Special Registration was required of persons already in the
United States and those newly entering the country. The program's
stated purpose \-vas to facilitate the "monitoring" of these aliens
"in the interest of national security."l3 INS fl iers had THIS NO
TICE IS FOR YOU splayed across the top, suggestive of the call
in notices posted for Japanese Americans living in the Western
United States during World War II.
According to the Department of Homeland Security, 82,880
persons living in the United States had been "sp�ciaIly" regis
tered by June 1, 2003 through call-in registration. Of these men
who \villingly complied ,vith the state's monitoring program,
13,434 were placed in removal (deportation) proceedings for visa

8
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violations, after they were cleared of connections to ter rorism.3t
Another 127,694 persons were registered at their U.S. Port of
Entry.35 Out of more than 200,000 persons registered by Sp ecial
Registration, only eleven \vere c harged with security-rel ated of
fenses, cases for which the outcome is not y et kno wn .
The arrest and detention of some 800 vo luntar y regis trants
during the first phase of the program in Southern California sparked
nationwide protes t. Persons seeking to comply \vith the rules
were handcuffed and led off to jail for visa viol ations; some re
ported verbal abuse and body cavity searches. Detainees were
forced to sleep on concrete floors, in group ho l ding cells. Most
of these early d etainees from Special Registration were Iranian
professionals and their family members who had not returned
to Iran after the Islamic revolution. They were wor king taxpay
ers \vith families who had othenvise lived la wfully (exce pt for
visa status issues) in the Un ited States for decades. Quite a few
had p ending applications for permanent residency.36 Aware that
their visa status was pro bl emati c, the y registered to demonstrate
their la\y a bidance and lack of cul pabilit y for any acts of terror.
Their keepers, however, h ad onl y the homogeniz ed image of the
guilty Muslim in their minds. Eventually, m ost of these detain
ees 'were released on bail and placed in removal (deportati on)
proceedings by the INS. The rel atively affluent class position and
organized nature of the Iranian American community in Los An
geles e nabled them to draw attention to their plight by la unch
ing a successful and speedy media campaign and string of pro
tests around the country. The director of the Southern California
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) said the
arrests \yere "remini scent of the in ternm en t of J apanese Ameri
cans during World War 11."37
The Special Registration program was a massive round up of
out-of-status Arab s, Asians, and North Africans from predomi
nantl y Muslim countries with f ew historical precedents in its
scale.3S It used the selective enforcement of im m igration laws to
target members of these groups for deportation, although they '
comprised less than one percent of the estimated three million
persons who were IIout of status" and the eight million undocu
mented in the United States.39 In additio n , tens of thousands of
Arabs and South Asians fled the United Stat es rather than submit
to Special Registration's tracking mechanisms. In Chicago, New
York, and other cities, Pakistani nei ghborhoods and businesses ap
peared to . b e vacated almost o vernight. Some families fled to the

9
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Canadian border seeking political asylum
After stating for months that the Special Registration program
was not discriminatory because it would be eventually expanded
to include all visiting aliens, the U.S. government announced the
.

progranl s phase out in May 2003. Government authorities never
clearly explained why p ersons from these twenty-five countries
'

were selected for the Special Registration program. At times.. the
government stated that the countries whose citizens and nation
als were required to reg ister ,vere selected because of the pres
ence of Al Qaeda, although countries with no known Ai Qaeda pres
ence 'were included and countries with a proven Ai Qaeda pres
ence, such as Germany and England, ,vere excluded. Broader
Bush administration programs to monitor Muslims who are U.S.
citizens include then FBI Director Robert Mueller's initiative to
base FBI goals for wire-tapping and undercover activities on the
number of mosques in an area.40
Because the Special Registration program targeted persons
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by their country of birth, it share s features of the fami ly of U.S.
policies based on i d ea s about race (beginning with slavery and
Indian removal), such as the 1790 Naturalization Law, which de
nied naturalized citizen ship to non-whites (repealed in 1952); the
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act (repealed in 1943)i the Asia Barred
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Zone (enacted in 1917 and revoked in 1952); and immigration quo
tas (enacted in 1921.. revised in 1924 and ended in 1965). When
immigration quotas were abolished in 1965, it signal ed the end
of an era in which U.S. immigration policies were based princi
pally on race. Thereafter, it wa s considered against liberal demo
cratic pr inciples to blatantly discriminate by country of birth. In
1981, however, pennission to regulate persons from certain Hforeign
states" re-emerged in immigration legislation, allowing the attor
ney general to require "n a tives of any one or more foreign states,
or any class of g ro u p thereof" to provide an address and other
information upon ten days notice. The Iran crisis of 1980 ,vas
specifically mentioned in the House Judiciary Committee report
submitted for the 1981 la w, which stated, "immediate access to
records of non-immigrants may
vital to our nation's secu
rity."41 Thus, the authority to implement selective immigration
procedures tied to country of birth \vas linked to U.S. strategic in

be

terests in the Middle East even before 9/11, and is tied to Ameri
can concerns about Islamist movements and the Iranian revolu
tion. Attorney General Ashcroft used this 1981 Jaw, as well as
precedents dating back to the 1790 Aliens and Seditions Acts, to
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authorize the domestic Special Registration.42
Even prior to Special Registration, more Arabs and South Asian
Muslims (none accused of terrorist connections) had been removed
from the United States as a consequence of the September 11 at-
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tacks than the number of foreign nationals deported for their political beliefs following the infamous 19191?almer Raids. The Department of Justice Inspector General's report confirmed at least
565 persons removed for visa violations from among those swept
up immediately after.the 9/11 attacks.o
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Hate Crimes: Indicators of
Ideological Penetration in Popular Culture
Public backlash against suspect members of Arab and South Asian
Muslim communities, who lie outside the parameters of culturaI citizenship, manifests itself in hate crimes, hate speech, and
job discrimination. In the first seven days fol lowing September
II, 2001, Arabs and South Asians reported 645 "bias incidents
and hate crimes" to the Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR).'" At end of six months, the figure rose to 1717, then declined to 325 reported incidents in the second six-month periodY
CAIR characterized the post 9/11 anti-Muslim attacks· as more
violent than those of prior years, indicating they were not a ne\v
phenomenon, and noted that they included a number of murders. In 2002, CAIR noted increasing reports of discrimination,
especially in the workplace and by government agents conducting raids, interrogations, searches, and property seizures; by 2003
reports of these incidents and hate crimes had increased 70 percent over 2002.46 In Chicago, more than 100 hate crimes against
Arabs and South Asian Muslims, as well as persons mistaken for

tlJ
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them, \vere reported to the Chicago Commission on Human Relations by the end of December 2001.47 In addition, several Arab
and South Asian Muslim institutions were attacked. On September 12, 2001, a mob of hundreds of angry whites, some shouting,
"kill the Arabsu and wielding 'weapons, commenced a march
to the largest, predominantly Arab mosque in Chicagoland.43 A'
predominantly South Asian and Arab mosque in suburban Villa
Park was vandalized in the spring of 2003, and attempts to build
two ne\v suburban mosques met with strong community opposition in 2004.49
In the ITIonths immediately following the September 11 attacks, Muslim women in Chicago repeatedly reported having their
head scarves yanked off or being spit at on the street.50 These inci-

11

Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"

I

-.

dents still occu� although with less frequency, and fear still exists
within local Arab and Muslim communities. Similar stri kes on
Muslim women have occurred n ation ally. For ex ample, on Octo 
ber 5, 2003, a Muslim \vornan wearing a hijab (head scarf) was at
tacked in a K-Mart parking lot in Springfiel d, Virgi nia. The white
male teenage attacker alle ge d ly shouted, Hyou terrorist p i g ,"
before run ni ng away. Many community leaders blame the U.S.
government's s\veeping and un fo cused actions in their commu
nities, and the media's sensational coverage of the "war on ter
rorism," for enco ur aging anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment.
Arab and South Asian Muslim concerns remain about profiling,

intolerance, and the long-term effects of discrimination.51

Islamophobia

Islam o phobi a is a pe rsistent strain of essentialist ideol ogie s that

criminalize Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims by claiming that

these groups deviate from normative cultural citizenship a nd pose

a threat to the

nation.52

As'ad AbuKhalil points out that embed

ded in these anti-Muslim views is the phenomenon of IItheologo

ce ntrism," by whi ch anti-Muslim scholars an d pol iti cians exp l a in

all political behaviors of Muslims or Arabs by reference to

Qurall.53

the

Neoconservative and Christian right spokespersons rou

tinely express displeasure with the idea of American so ciety em
bracing Muslims. They describe Islam as a religion

outside the

pale of human values and some have labeled Muslims as uworse

than Nazis/'s.! Evangelists Lind and Weyri ch, in a boo klet

titled
WJzy Islam is a Threat to America alId tile West, argue that Muslims
IIshould be encoura ge d to leave. Th ey are a fifth column in this

country."55

Community Impact of State Policies

In ord er to show the ways in which state polici es have affected
sp ecific communities of A ra bs , South Asians, and Muslims \ve
briefly examine two urban areas, Chicago and Cambridge/Bos
ton. It is inte resting to juxtapose findings from South Asi an, Arab,
a nd Muslim communities in these two locales, which have been
discussed much less than New York in the context of post-9/11
issues, and wh ich have their own p olitic al, ethnic, and religi ous
l andscape s . We focus on the experiences of women i n Chicago
and you th in th e Boston area, building on our own research ex
pertise, in o rd er t o she d light on the ways in which post-9/11
targeting has shaped experiences of gender a nd generation .
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Metropolitan Chicago is h ome to a diverse Muslim community
of around 400,000, including African Americans, Sou th A si ans,
Arabs, East Europeans, and a growing number of c onver ts, an d
has s ome sixty m osqu e s. Backlash for the 9/11 attacks be gan
almost immediately with ve rbal attacks on persons assumed to
be Arab or Muslim, phy sical assaults, phone threats, and arson
of Muslim institutions. In research conducted for a post 9/11
impact study fundedby theRussell SageFo un dati on, a m aj ority
ofArabs andMuslimsin Chica go reported feeling that theyw ere
livingin a state of siege for fu lly three years after the terr or istattacks of 2001.
Interviews wit h young, college-educated, middle-classArabAmerican wo men, who are part ofthe larger study's sample, show
that their l iv esw er e dr amatic ally ch an ge dby t he events of9/11.
Shor t ly after the 9/11 attacks, one woman \vea ri ng a llijab was
verb ally assaulted when a \vornan in the carnext to hershouted;
IIIf I had a gun 1'd shootyou n ow!" Other women re po rte d their
veilsbeing ripped off their heads. Womenwho wearthe hijab reported thatUthe stares, the refusal to look me in the face, andthe
verbal insults" pe rs isted years after the attacks. Nearly all women
interviewed, mulzajibaat (vei le d) ornot, still s ay they fear for their
safety when they are inpl ace sthat lack ethnic diversity or areas
that are all white. One ArabMuslim woman said, "You won't find
me ih ap ark or a forest p re se rv e," while an othe r said, "Soccer
moms scare me the most." Alla gre ed that Muslim women who
wear the lrijab arc the most vulnerable to assault inAmer ic an sodety, because they are so e as ily spotted and targeted.
Feeling unsafe is notlimited tothe public sphere. The federal
govern me nt' spattern ofinterrogations, a rre st s, home invas ions,
spying, and property confiscations appear random, un fo c us ed,
and discriminatory to members of the Arab and Muslim c ommunity. T he government'suse ofsecretevidence, closed h earin gs,
eavesdropping on attorneys, and special registration ofArabs and
South Asian Muslims have not built commu nit y confidence in
the government, or in the claimthati ts only target is terrorists and
people who supportthem. As a consequence, nearly everyone in
thec ommun ity feels vulnerable toa certain degree, even in their
ownhomes. Consider that afterthe 9/11 attacks, law enforcement
authorities received 96,000 anonymous tips from persons reporting onArab, SouthAsian, andMuslim neighbors.56
Post-9/11 racism has spilled over into thework site and injob
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discrimination against Muslims in Chica go as well. Some women
report they are forced to listen to anti-Arab jokes and anti-Muslim
comments at v{ork. Others must face off-the-cuff remarks such
as: Ills that a bomb in your briefcase?" A few ,v ome n re ported
l os ing their closest \vork colleagues after 9 / 11, ,vhen suddenly
all M u sl i m s were suspect. Many women say they are afraid
to cha nge jobs for fe ar that they will n o t find a n ew employer.
Some report choosing to h id e th ei r Arab and Mus limid enti ty on
the job, pos in g as Greeks or Italians. There is no doubt that the
Jzijab will prove to be a m ajor barrier to employment and promo
tion for Muslim women.
IIWe are in a desperate situation. We were isolated from others
and w� need to build b rid ges," sa d
i one Chi ca go Muslim commu
nity leader. Post-9/ 11 formations within the Muslim community
in Ch ica go revea lu np reced ented p an-Isl amic boundary crossing.
This is perhaps best exemplified in Radio I slam, in au gu ra ted
in la te 2004. Radio Islam's pro d uce rs, researchers, and e m ce e s
span the ra nge of African-American, A s i an, Arab, A.frican, and
European Musl im s. Their topics are s imilarl y pan-Islamic a nd
global. Pan,-Islamic activities a re also underway in civil ri ghts
o rgani zi n gand defense, in the health care arena, among Mus li m
social ,vorkers, and in domestic vi olence p re ven tion . The pre
domin antly Arab Bri d gevi e\v mosque hosted Chinese American
Muslim James Vee, the fo rmer Musli m ch ap lain at Guantanalno
Bay who Was falsely accused of espionage by the government.
Th e case Qf now exonerated James Vee, and the efforts of his mili
tary col lea gu es at Guan tanamo Bay to criminalize his actions, is a
classic exampl e of hOlV profiling can transform e veryd ay actions
into supposed criminal behavior. Ev en gre ater bou nd ary . cros s
ing can be expected from the organized acti v ities of secon d- gen 
eration Muslims, who are less constrained by affinities of culture
and la ngu a ge than their immi gr an t parents.
Interfaith alliances also surfaced in Chicago during the post9 / 11 period as grass roo ts interfaith activists formed a protec
ti ve circle around the Bridgeview mosque in the days after the
9 / 11 attacks. Imm igrant ri gh ts coalitions a nd ci vil ri ghts groups
strengthened their working relationships with Ch ica go'S Arab,
South Asian, and Muslim communities because of s hared con
cerns over the go vernmen t's p ol i cies . To ge ther they protested the
government's S p e ci al Registration progr am and deportations,
assenlbling with banners at the federal b uildin gand offering sup
port to registtees. Gi ve ntheir pre-9 / 11 experiences of subordi 
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n ati on a nd fed eral governm ent p ro fil in g, C hi cago 's A rab commu n i ty a l re a dy had strong ties ,yUh National Lawyers Guild
attorneys and prog re ssi ve ethnic c oa l it i o ns . These external a l1iances are particularly imp ort ant s in ce A rab, Sou th A sian, and
Muslim community resources have been redi rected and e xtensively depleted a ft e r 9 / 11 due to the financial d eman ds of l ega l
defense and civil rights ,york. There is less evidence, however,
of the critical n ext step, ,�hen communities of Lati nos, Afri ca n
Americans, Arabs, and South Asia ns 'would march t oge ther for
their com m on interests. This type of sol i dari ty requ ires a n oth er
level of work that must emerge from within Arab, South Asian,
African American and Latino g rassroots commu n i ty org ani za tions and is com plicate d by class-based r e l at i onshi p s between
and among the� e groups .
The fault lines, as well as po tential fluidity, of traditional Asian
American organiz i ng were widely evid ent after 9 / 11, when the
Chicago Comm issi on on Human Relations Arab Affairs Commis. sion took actions to represe nt Asian hate crime vi ct ims because
the Asi an Commission had not hist orica lly c oncerned itself with
iss ue s affecting Sou th o r West Asi ans. S im ilarly, A fghanis, IraniansI a n d Pakistanis who 'were called in for Special Registration in
Chic ago found no l a rger ethnic or geographically based organi..
zation to d efen d them. Fitting neatly into neither Arab nor Asian
categories, as these two pan-ethnic groups have been traditionally defined a n d o rgan ize d in the U.S., they found themselves
without any representa tion to challeng e their treatment. Post9 / 11 exp eri ences have d ra wn these groups t ogether, trans cending traditional boundaries of race and geography, which they had
no role in estab lishi ng .
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confront their belonging in the n a ti on-s t a te . This se ction focuses
in part i cular on South Asian Muslim immigrant youth and draws
on findings from an ethno graphi c study conducted in 2001-2003
of working-class, Indian, Pakistani, and B angla deshi imm ig ra nt
students in the publi c h igh school in Cambridge, Massachusetts
and the impact of 9 / 11 on their notions of cultural citizenship.57
The research also inv olv ed intervi ews with im mi gra nt parents,
school staff, community a n d religious leaders, city officials, and
commu n i ty activi sts.
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The Ca.mbridge public high school has an extremely diverse
student bo d y that reflects the city's changing population, with
students from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia.58
The South Asian immigrant student population is predominant
ly working- to lower-middle class and most work after school in
part-time jobs in the service sector, such as fast food or retail. The
majority of the Indian immigrant youth are from Sunni Muslim
families, most from small towns or villages in Gujarat in Western
India.
While local Muslim organizations or mosques in the Boston
area draw a diverse Arab, North Africanl, Asian, and African Ameri
can population, the families of these working-class South Asian
inunigrant youth tend to socialize mainly with people from their
own ethnic community. Furthermore, they generally do not affil
iate with the Indian·American or Pakistani American community
organizations in the Boston area either, which tend to involve
middle- to upper-middle class, suburban families.59 In some in
stances, class boundaries within South Asian American commu
nities persisted and undermined community cohesiveness after
9 l it and often those who truly were most vulnerable and could
not afford legal counsel did not have the support of community
organizations led by South Asian elites. The anti..MusIim and Hin
du nati onal ist sentiment that has existed among segments of the
Indian immigrant community as the Hindu Right has become a
powerful movement in India, 'was one of the factors underlying the
failure of many Indian American organizations to support or de
fend their Muslim compatriots, other than paying mere lip service.
For example, the Indian Association of Greater Boston, the Pakistani
Association of Greater Boston, as well as regional organizations
representing the sizeable Gujarati community in the Boston area
tended to serve middle- and upper-middle class families gener
ally living in the suburbs. The Gujarati organizations were pre
donlinantly Hindu in membership and so did not include any of
the Gujarati Muslim families in Cambridge. Given the massacre
of Muslims in Gujarat in Spring 2002, religion is a highly charged
issue within the Indian imnligrant community. One of the Gujara- '
ti leaders interviewed for this study refused to comment on the
inclusion of Muslims in his organization; other Indian commu
nity leaders were less defensive and some had even participated
in marches for peace in South Asia during the military conflict on
the Indo-Pakistani border and so presumably were more critical
of communalism or nationalism in South Asia. However, in gen-
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eral, it was apparent that class cleavages and religious tensions enlbedded in homeland politics contributed to a sense of isolation
for some South Asian Muslims and to a highlighting, rather than
erosion, of fissures within some Indian American communities .
It i s possible that the state's racial profiling of Muslims coinciding with anti:..MusIim sentiments within South Asian commu·
nities could strengthen Muslim or pan-Islamic identity among
the younger generation of South Asian immigrants, as happened
for an earlier generation of South Asian Muslim youth in Britain.60
In their daily lives, South Asian immigrant youth do, in fact, hang
out 'with Muslim African youth, especially, 'who are from Somalia, Ethiopia, or Egypt, forming an incipient pan-Islamic identity,
but they also socialize with Latino, Caribbean, African American,
and Asian students. For example, an Indian Muslim studl!nt, Isn1ail, argued for a more expansive conception of community: "I
hang out with different kids I say if you 'want to live in a different \vorld, you have to exist with them . . .Sometimes you have
to go outside [your group] and say, yeah, alright, we are friends
too . . .your relationship is gonna be bigger, right."
What was striking was the ways in which some South Asian
Muslim youth seemed to go beyond simply expressing ideas of
cultural -difference and commonality, in a lllu lticulturalist vein,
to actually grapple with ideas about political and structural similarities others. Some of the students had gained a deeper understanding of their commonalities with African American youth
as a result of their experiences with anti-Muslim racism, which
they compared to anti-Black racism. Other South Asian immigrant
youth, particularly the Muslim boys, felt targeted by other high
school youth after 9 / 11 . Accusations of "you're a terrorist" or
"you're a bin Laden" entered into what might otherwise be just
an outbreak of youthful aggression among boys, perhaps, but
had now become a part of a national discourse about 1s1a111. Yet,
some of the boys, in particular, who had been targets of anti-Muslim incidents felt closer to the experiences of racial profiling endured by African Americans, as a result, and shared a critique of
the U.S.'s racist policies toward people of color. One of the boys
commented that, in his view, African Americans were not as shattered by the 9 / 11 attacks on the U.S. because they feel alienated
from the nation-state due to the legacy of slavery. While this racialized difference after 9 / 11 is obviously more complex, what
is important is that some youth believed that African Americans
share their experience of marginalized cultural citizenship ,vithin
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the nation. While these young people are not involved in formal

political organizations, they had a political analysis of the post9 / 11 climate that led to inter-racial affiliations.
In the Boston area, there were instances of formal alliances

zd

��

on an organizational level between S outh Asian a nd Arab American commun.ities and civil and immigrant rights organizations.
For example, after 9 / 11, members of the Massachusetts chapter
of the American Arab Anti-DiSCrimination Committee, a national
civil rights organization, as well as of the South Asian Committee on
Human Rights, a grassroots gtoup in the Boston area.. particip ated
in the New England Immigrant and Detainees Right Network.. a

of
o III

U. "

Al

coalition that included Asian Anlerican, Latino(a), and white immigrant and civil. right activists and that organized around Special

Registration, deten.tion, and deportations. There \vere also joint
activities focused on persecution of Arab, South Asian, and Muslim Americans organized by a loose network of Asian, Latino,
Brazilian, and Haitian civil and immigrant rights groups. It is not
clear yet what the long-lasting impact of these alliances \-vill be,
but these coalitions have raised important questions about secu-

larism and civil rights; race and religion, and nationalism and class.

Allia nces

One of the interestiIlg things to note in the political rhetoric used

by those discussing, and even protesting, the "racial profiling" of
South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans is that the racial ambiguities of all three categories are generally not fully acknowledged in this discourse. Moustafa Bayoumi calls this the "tragic
irony" of "racial profiling" after 9 / 11.61 Muslim identity is not,
technically, a racial category but in speaking of "anti-Muslim racism," for example, it is apparent that Muslim identity is treat-

ed as if it were a racial category by processes that are similar to
those that comprise racial profiling in the U.S., for example, "flying while Muslinl," referring to the profiling of Muslim and Arab
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passengers at airports and on airp lanes, or "speaking out while
Arab / Palestinian/' referring to the censorship of pro-Palestine
political speech. Race is, after all, a social and ideological construction and so the criminalization of Muslim Americans shows
that Islam increasingly operates as a racial category in public discourse as well a s practice.
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Arabs and South Asians are both groups that have been ambiguously racialized in the U.S., variously classified as "white"
and non-white at different moments. In 1 923, the Supreme Court

co

A

18

- . . -. . .

.. .. .

.

. . .. . .

. .... .

.

Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"

�

pa
ch

,ii. -

,

.

Ejl
a
�

nal
)st-

.ces
erims.
) ter
Inal
! on
ted
k, a
imcial
)int

us-

no,

not
be,

cu-

:tSs.

sed

, of
lmwl-

Igic

lOt,

'ac�atr to
fly -

rab
liIe
ine
onIWS

lis-

ml-

.te"
lurt

ru le d that Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian i mmigrant, wa s te chni..
c ally Caucasi an but could not be consi de red \vhite in the understanding of the II common man" and so was ineligible for citizenship.62 In general, Asian Americans have been positioned in

various ways between the American racial polari ty of black and
white. As Gary Okihiro has observe d, at some moments gr()up s
of Asi an Americans have been considered linear black" and a t
others, 1/al mos t white."63
Arabs were cal led "Syri ans" \vhen they first mig rated to the
U.S. in large numbers, around the turn of the twe ntieth ce ntury.

A l th ou gh o ffici al ly considered IIwhite," their el igib ili ty for naturalization came into di sp ute in certain locations, especially in
parts of the South and in nor thern industrial cities where they
were u ni on laborers.64 In a S o u th ern case, the a pp el la te c o ur t
ruled in Dow v. The United States (1915) that IJSyrians" \vere of
the Semitic branch of th e Caucasian race and thu s elig ib l e for
U.S. cit i z enship.65 In Detroit, John Moha mm e d A l i arg u e d before a U.S. District Court (1925) in a ca se that sought t o re voke
his naturalization (based on the Thind decision) that although he
·was born in Ind i a, he was Arabian, since his a ncesto rs had originated in Arabia. The judge replied that Ali's an ces t ry was not
at issue . He had da rk skin and fit all the other c riteri a that defined the "common understanding" of no n-whi te. Judges in Detroit and Buffalo consistently denied Ar abs naturalization rights,
wi thout i ssu i ng written opinio ns that could be appealed.66 Many
Arabs have rejected th ei r official des i gnati o n as Cau casi a n and
white, b eca u se of thei r treatment in Ame rica n society (a sentiment crystallized after 9 / 11), because Ar abs c � mpr is e a range of
phen o types and cannot be co n taine d by the concept of race, and
because they ba sical ly disagree with organizing people by color.
As long as they remain officially \vhite, they are, i neligible for the
benefits that a cc rue to members of recognized minority groups
and, more critically, they remain invisible to persons c once rned
with the status of minorities.67
While some had thought Arabs and Muslims were on the
path to gaining cultural ci ti zenship in the U.S., post-9/ 11 events
change d all that. The questions nearly all have been a sked, such
as Uwhere are you from?" and "are you a terrorist?," and comments
telling them to " go back where you came from" revealed the borderlines between whiteness and otherness. The ove rwhel ming
consistency of responses in a post-9/ 11 study indicating that ArabAmericans feel least safe among whites shows that violent back-
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lash is a phenomenon associated by them 'with white America.
The everyday cultural and social processes that accompany the
state-driven "war on terror" construct Arabs and Muslims as not
entitled to the same rights and privileges (i.e., cultural citizenship)
that accrue to members of white society or /lreal" Americans, in
cluding the privilege against profiling and guilt by association.
Federal government actions only serve to reinforce this idea. One
often hears Muslims in Chicago remark that after the Oklahoma
City bombings by Timothy McVeigh and his associates, nei ther
all Christians nor all Irish became suspect citizens. The privileged
are treated ,vith individual precision, the non-privileged are pro
filed and punished collectively. However, since heightened U.S.
nationalism and xenophobia have filtered into other immigrant
and minority communities, some parts of these communities have
absorbed anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia, making this a more
complex and difficult issue.68
For many South Asian and Arab AmericansJ the post-9/11
backlash was a lesson in the ideological construction of race in
the U.S. Some who believed that they would be shielded from
racism because they \vere wealthy and inhabited predominantly
white spaces found their "model minority" status stripped from
them. It i� important to show links between the social position
ing of Arab and South Asian Americans to Uncover the 'ways in
wh ich racial formation in the U.S. conjoins issues of material privi
lege, legal reg ulation, and state power. There are important alli
ances that need to be forged between these and other communi
ties that ,vould go beyond the confines of multiculturalist differ
ence" and build connections based on an analysis of political and
material processes. For example, South Asian, Arab, and Muslim
Americans who now have heightened concerns about issues of
detention have much to learn from African Americans, Latinos,
and Native Americans who have long fought against racism
especially that of the prison-industrial complex, and advocated
for the rights of political prisoners. They have much to learn as
well as from the historical experiences of Japanese Americans,
who were incarcerated during World War II. The latter alliance
was made more visibly than the first after 9/11, through pub:'
lic statements of solidarity by Japanese American activists and
documentary films that visually linked the experiences of both
communities. Yet in order for there to be a deeper alliance be
tween subordinated groups in the U.S., these symbolic alliances
need to go beyond a politics of representation and address the
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. historical impact of U.S. empire. Yet it is also true that responses
by South Asian, Arab, and Muslim Americans themselves often

remain \vithin the realm of the symbolic and are enacted through
protests that make visual and discursive statemehts, instead of
ongoing politi cal campaigns that challenge the very premise and
goals of the state's profiling and link it larger imperial policies in
the Middle East and South Asia.

Conclusion

The q uestion

of whether and how Arab Americans and South
Asian Americans should \york together, and how to define the
relationship of Arab Americans to Asian Americans, raises two
important issues mentioned at the beginning of this essay: the
meaning of solidarity, and second, the role of boundari�s. Soli
darity, Vijay Prashad reminds us, is a desire that is actualized
through a " tremendous act of production" for NUllity is not wait
ing to happen.u69 The identities that bind Asian Americans to
Arab Americans need not be just of shared victirnhood, but could
be based in shared histories of contact and trade preceding West
ern hegemony, in common visions of liberation from colonialism,
in collective memories of nationalist struggle, and in the alliances
forged between newly independent Arab and South Asian na
tion-states by the non-aligned movement.70 It is in this political
and epistemological spirit that we need to reconsider the bound
aries between Asian American and Arab American studies. A
s trategicallY 'cotuparative approach rooted in a shared history
and vision of solidarity, rejecting externally imposed divisions,
·would help keep in sigh t the political \york of boundaries: aca
demic, geographic, and cultural.
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